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Do multinational banks’ branches reduce their lending in foreign markets (host country) more than 
subsidiaries in response to changes in the regulatory environment in their domestic markets (home 
country)? And if so, how strong is this effect and how long does it prevail? To answer these questions, 
we exploit a novel dataset on changes in the intensity of macroprudential regulation in approximately 
70 countries. Our analysis focuses on the effect of tightening of capital requirements, lending 
standards and reserve requirements on foreign banks’ lending to bank and non-bank borrowers in the 
United Kingdom.   
Our work is motivated by three strands of the empirical literature. First, studies that document how 
multinational banks transmit financial shocks to their balance sheets across country borders. Cetorelli 
and Goldberg (2012) find that during the recent financial crisis banks from advanced economies 
restricted their credit supply in developing markets. Schnabl (2012) and Chava and Purnanandam 
(2011) show that international banks’ liquidity shocks triggered by the 1998 Russian default crisis 
were transmitted via interbank lending to Peru and the US, respectively. Aiyar (2012) documents how 
foreign banks contributed to the lending contraction in the UK during the crisis by withdrawing 
funding from UK-resident affiliates. Giannetti and Laeven (2012) show that crisis periods increase 
home bias among multinational banks, which shift from foreign to domestic lending.  
A second strand of literature examines heterogeneities in these bank balance sheet spillovers. De Haas 
and Van Horen (2013) use the collapse of Lehman Brothers as an exogenous shock to internationally 
operating banks and find that foreign-owned banks significantly contract their lending in host 
markets. However, the key finding for this paper is the substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which 
different banks retrenched from the same country. Banks reduced credit supply mainly in countries 
geographically distant from their home country, countries where foreign banks were less experienced, 
where they operated under a branch structure, and where they were disintegrated from the network of 
domestic co-lenders. Popov and Udell (2012) study whether contraction of lending provided by 
foreign banks may be sensitive to parent banks’ balance sheet conditions. They find that firms in 
emerging market countries experienced more difficulty obtaining credit from foreign banks whose 
parent banks suffered from negative shocks to their financial conditions. Firms in their sample were 
particularly constrained in localities served by banks with lower Tier 1 capital ratios. In addition to 
these studies Hoggarth, Hooley, and Korniyenko (2013) shows that lending provided by foreign 
branches in the UK was more volatile during the recent financial crisis compared to lending provided 
by foreign banks’ subsidiaries.1 
1 Goulding and Nolle (2012) also show that foreign branches lending was much more volatile compared to lending provided 
by subsidiaries in the US, whereas Albetrazzi and Bottero (2014) find that foreign owned branches operating in Italy shrunk 
their lending in response to the collapse of the Lehman Brothers much more than subsidiaries of multinational banks. 
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Finally, a literature related to our work focuses on cross-border spillovers of regulatory changes via 
multinational banks operations. Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) evaluate the effect of the Japanese 
market collapse which coincided with the introduction of the Basel Accord in Japan in the early 
1990s. They find that multinational Japanese banks whose capital ratios fell below the required level 
due to rapid declines of the stock market retrenched their commercial and industrial, and real estate 
lending in the US, to comply with the new, tighter capital regulation. More recently, Aiyar, Calomiris, 
Hooley, Korniyenko, and Wieladek (2014a) examine the effect of bank specific capital requirements 
on foreign banks’ credit supply. They document that banks subject to stringent capital regulation in 
their domestic markets (home country) reduce lending in the foreign markets (host country) by 5.5 
percentage points following a 100 basis points increase in required capital adequacy. Using the same 
dataset on bank specific capital requirements, Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014b) also find a 
negative correlation between the intensity of regulation and lending provided by affected banks in 
their domestic market. Cross-border spillovers of financial regulation were also found to affect banks’ 
lending standards.  Ongena, Popov, and Udell (2013) find that banks respond to tighter lending 
standards in the home country by taking more risk in foreign markets proxied by more lending to ex 
ante risky firms. 
Our main contribution to this literature is that we explore how the change in lending by foreign banks 
to the UK in response to regulatory changes in their home countries depends on whether the lending is 
done via a branch or a subsidiary. However, an important question is why would the change in 
lending differ depending on the organisational form of foreign banks? We argue that it does do 
because of the legal distinction between branches and subsidiaries.2 Under the branch structure 
foreign affiliates constitute an inseparable part of the parent organisation. This structure allows for 
cheaper and more flexible transfer of funds between the parent and its foreign entity. Subsidiaries on 
the contrary are considered as stand-alone institutions, with their own board of directors. Unlike 
branches, subsidiaries are separately capitalised and are subject to the host country regulations 
(Hoggarth, Hooley, and Korniyenko, 2013; Fiechter, Otker-Robe, Ilyna, Hsu, Santos, and Surti, 
2011)3.  
2 When deciding on the structural form of foreign operations multinational banks are considering a number of factors, among 
which regulatory and taxation arrangements in the host country play a major role (Fiechter et al. 2011). Another key factor 
determining such decisions is the business model of the banking group (Hoggarth, Hooley, and Korniyenko, 2013). Banks 
focusing mainly on the wholesale operations may prefer to operate in host country under the branch structure, whilst 
subsidiary structure may be benfit those banking groups which aim to serve retail customers and establish banking 
relationships in the host market. Dell’Arrica and Marquez (2010) also consider various host country risks as important 
determinants in this decision making process. The theoretical model developed by the authors suggests that subsidiary 
structure benefits the banking group by protecting it from economic risks due to limited parent-affiliate liability (such risks 
may result from changes in the macroeconomic conditions, which in turn may affect creditworthiness of borrowers and thus 
lead to higher default rates). Branch structure on the other hand is more beneficial in countries where expropriation risk is 
higher (example of expropriation risks include forcing banks to hold government debt or lending to favoured institutions). 
Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia and Martinez-Peria (2007) provide the empirical evidence supporting these findings. 
3 This does not imply that subsidiaries will not be affected by the home country macroprudential regulation. For instance 
banking groups calculating adequate level of capital use consolidated balance sheet information, which includes assets and 
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More importantly, the organizational form of foreign affiliate also determines the degree of control 
which the parent organization holds over its foreign affiliate. Given that branches form an integral 
part of the parent bank, but in contrast that subsidiaries business decisions need to be verified and 
approved by their own board of directors, it should be easier for the parent to control a branch relative 
to a subsidiary. Therefore, one could expect that in case of a capital requirement tightening, the parent 
bank might find it easier and swifter to reduce lending provided by its foreign branches (relative to its 
subsidiaries) in order to meet a given capital ratio.4 This is the main focus of our paper. 
Providing compelling evidence that the magnitude of the cross-border regulatory spillovers varies 
with the organizational structure of foreign banks affiliates requires addressing several challenges. 
First, decisions regarding lending retrenchment depend to a large extent on the decisions made at the 
parent bank level. These decisions can reflect strength of parents lending relationship both at home 
and abroad (Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000) or the “level” of the home bias (Giannetti and Laeven, 
2012). Geographical distance between banks’ home and host countries might also affect banking 
groups’ strategies with respect to cross-border lending (Ayiar et al. 2014, De Haas and Van Horen, 
2012).  
Second, changes in the intensity of macroprudential regulation can disproportionately affect banking 
groups due to their balance sheet characteristics. For instance, banks or banking group with low 
capital buffers prior to a tightening in capital regulation might respond differently to those holding a 
higher capital buffer (Popov and Udell, 2012). Similarly, Mora (2014) suggests that banks holding 
lower excess reserves are likely to reduce their lending more to absorb an increase in required 
reserves relative to banks holding higher excess reserves. Kashyap and Stein (2000) show the effect of 
monetary policy on banks’ lending is significantly influenced by banks’ balance sheet liquidity.  
Third, country-time-varying factors might also influence banking groups’ lending strategies in foreign 
markets. For example, increasing (decreasing) demand for parent banks’ products in the home market 
might provide an impulse to lend less (more) in foreign markets.  
Given this, in order to accurately establish the degree to which organisational form affects the cross-
border transmission of changes in the intensity of regulation one needs to control for all factors which 
might affect parent banks’ lending decisions. But this is made difficult by the fact that many of these 
aspects, such as the strength of home bias, are difficult to observe and quantify. We overcome this 
problem by using an identification strategy that focuses on UK lending provided by branches and 
subsidiaries which belong to the same banking group. In other words, we limit our sample to foreign 
affiliates of multinational banks which operate at least one branch and one subsidiary in the United 
capital of all their foreign affiliates, including subsidiaries. Therefore, in response to capital requirements tightening banking 
group might decide to reduce lending of their branches, subsidiaries, or both in order to keep the Tier 1 capital ratio constant. 
4 We elaborate on this more in the hypothesis section of this paper. 
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Kingdom. This allows us to exploit heterogeneities in the response to macroprudential regulation 
using difference-in-difference estimations while including banking group-time fixed effects. 
Therefore, one could think of our analysis as one where we compare the difference in the lending 
behaviour of branches and subsidiaries before and after the regulatory intensity adjustment as if all 
foreign institutions belonged to the same banking group.  
The UK is an ideal country to examine whether spillovers depend on the organisational form because 
there are more than 150 branches and approximately 100 subsidiaries of multinational banks operating 
in the country and, in addition, there a number of banking groups operating under both organisational 
structures. Together, branches and subsidiaries account for a high share of lending in the UK. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, during the period 1997-2014 both branches (40pp) and subsidiaries (10%) 
provided approximately 50% of loans to the UK borrowers. Figure 1 also shows differences in the 
business models of both bank structures. Branches provide significantly more lending to other 
financial institutions operating in the UK, whilst subsidiaries mainly focus on lending provided to 
non-bank borrowers.  
Using our identification strategy we show that regulatory tightening in the home country 
disproportionately affects different organisational types of foreign banks. We find that an increase in 
capital requirements at home causes foreign branches to reduce their lending growth to other financial 
institutions operating in the UK by 6.3pp more than foreign subsidiaries. However, we also find 
heterogeneity in the statistical significance of our results with respect to the type of macroprudential 
regulation and type of lending. Importantly, a tightening in lending standards and reserve 
requirements do not affect branches and subsidiaries differently. Additionally, we find that none of 
the macroprudential regulations in our sample cause disparities in the provision of lending to the non-
bank borrowers.  
One has to be cautious with the interpretation of these results. Our estimates indicate that a lending 
standards or a reserve requirements tightening in the home market does not affect banks’ lending in 
the host countries. It is still possible that changes in the intensity of regulation have an effect on 
lending by both branches and subsidiaries, however estimating these results is beyond the scope of 
this paper. In this paper we are explicitly interested in documenting whether the effects of 
macroprudential regulations on cross-border banks’ lending vary with the institutional form of foreign 
activities.5 In an additional set of tests we also find that the differential effect of a change in 
macroprudential regulation is only contemporaneous. We find that in the first, second and third 
quarter following tightening of regulation both branches and subsidiaries do not exhibit statistically 
significant differences in their lending behaviour. We strengthen our identification estimating placebo 
5 Similarly, tighter capital requirements might also affect lending provided by foreign branches and subsidiaries to private 
sector non-bank borrowers. Our estimates do not rule out such possibility. Instead we argue that the effect of capital 
requirements does not differ between branches and subsidiaries for this type of lending. 
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regressions, excluding control variables and providing results of regressions with alternative 
clustering of standard errors. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section explains our data. In Section 3 we discuss 
our identification strategy. We present our results in Section 4, and finally we conclude in Section 5.   
2. Hypotheses and Data 
2.1 Hypotheses 
2.1.1 Capital requirements 
Ayiar et al. (2014a) test hypotheses predicting the relationship between the intensity of capital 
requirements and banks’ cross-border lending. Banks which are required to increase their capital 
ratios can do it either by increasing their capital (capital issue, retained earnings), reducing their 
capital buffer or by reducing their risk weighted assets. Since raising capital is expensive, and the 
empirical evidence suggests that banks prefer to keep a constant capital buffer, banks may prefer to 
reduce risk weighted assets. Multinational banks, which calculate their capital ratio based on 
consolidated accounts, including assets of their cross-border branches and subsidiaries have a choice 
of either reducing lending in the home market or in the foreign markets. Since bank operations in their 
home markets could be more important to preserve, banks are likely to prefer to contract lending 
provided by their foreign affiliates in their host markets.  
Our study expands this hypothesis by studying whether cross-border banks’ response to 
macroprudential regulation varies with their organizational form of their foreign affiliates. In other 
words, we want to find out if branches of multinational banks restrict their lending to a greater extent 
than multinational banks’ subsidiaries. The main factor which makes us believe that such 
heterogeneity exists is the degree of control which parent banks hold over their foreign affiliates. A 
foreign entity operating under the branch structure constitutes an integral part of the parent bank. Its 
assets and liabilities constitute a fraction of the parent organization. Subsidiaries, on the contrary, 
under most circumstances are treated as separate institutions. They have their own board of directors 
making decisions regarding the functioning of the subsidiary.6 They are separately capitalized and 
regulated by the host country (Hoggarth et al., 2013). Further, in case of distress parent banks are not 
always required to provide financial assistance to their subsidiaries, in contrast to branches. Given 
6 Even if the board of directors is appointed by the parent bank decisions such as whether to reduce lending have to be 
approved by subsidiaries board, which makes this process longer than in case of branches. 
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these differences we hypothesise that the cross-border effect of capital requirements to be more 
pronounced for branches rather than subsidiaries.7 
2.1.2 Lending standards 
To construct the hypotheses related to lending standards regulation we follow the reasoning in 
Ongena, Popov and Udell (2013), who consider a number of mechanisms which can explain potential 
effects of home country lending standards on banks cross-border activities. First, in response to tighter 
lending standards and tougher regulation banks may adopt more conservative lending approaches at 
home, which they then pass on to their foreign affiliates. Foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries 
may also adopt less risky lending strategy for reputational reasons; the perception of bad risk 
management at an affiliate may have a negative impact on the reputation of the parent bank. 
Conversely, multinational banks subject to tighter lending standards might try to employ more risky 
lending strategies in foreign markets to compensate for inability to extract higher returns from more 
risky borrowers at home.  
Ongena, et al. (2013) find support in their data for the third of these hypotheses: multinational banks 
subject to tighter regulation at home engage in more risky lending in the foreign markets. This finding 
does not mean that foreign banks increase the quantity of lending in the host countries following 
tightening of regulation at home. Banks adopting a more risky lending approach could substitute 
lending to more risky borrowers for less risky borrowers. In such a case, we would not expect any 
changes in aggregate (risky + non-risky) lending growth provided by branches and/or subsidiaries of 
multinational banks operating in the UK following a tightening of lending standards in their home 
markets. 
In addition, it is likely that lending standards impact branches and subsidiaries in a similar way 
because they are applied to lending in the home market of the parent bank and – contrary to capital 
regulations – do not place a restriction on the balance sheet of the group as a whole.  
2.1.3 Reserve requirements 
Finally, our paper evaluates the effect of reserve requirements on multinational banks cross-border 
lending. According to the “bank lending view” of monetary transmission increasing reserves should 
result in credit supply contraction (Kashyap and Stein, 2000).8 An increase in the reserve 
requirements acts as an implicit tax because the interest rates central banks pay on reserves held by 
banks are often below market rates. As a result of a tightening of reserve requirement it is likely that 
7 Multinational banks calculate their capital ratios based on consolidated accounts, which include assets of their cross-border 
branches and subsidiaries, and therefore although subsidiaries are subject to host country regulation they will also be subject 
to macroprudential regulation in their home markets. 
8 In a more recent paper Kashyap and Stein (2012) develop theoretical model which shows that the central bank can control 
credit supply increasing or decreasing quantity of reserves in conjunction with adjusting interest rate on reserves. 
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we would observe an increase in the loan-deposit rate spread, and consequently a fall in aggregate 
lending. Additionally, higher reserves mean banks have fewer funds available to lend, which can 
directly affect banks’ lending provision.9  Mora (2014) provides an empirical evidence for the effect 
of reserve requirements on banks’ lending.10  
Considering that the liabilities of foreign branches are directly on the balance sheet of the parent bank 
it is likely that branches of foreign banks operating in the UK will also increase their loan-deposit rate 
spreads in response to higher reserve requirements in their home countries. Higher cost of credit for 
UK borrowers should therefore result in a reduction of lending provided by branches, relative to 
subsidiaries of foreign banks. Alternatively, parent banks might attempt to absorb the effect of higher 
reserve requirements by benefiting from cross-border internal capital flows (Mora, 2014).11 Providing 
funds to parent banks might have an adverse effect on the ability of foreign affiliates to sustain 
lending in the host country at the same level. Since capital flows between parent bank and its 
affiliated branches are subject to lower constraints compared to subsidiaries, we would expect foreign 
branches to be more active in smoothing reserve requirements shocks to their parent institutions, and 
therefore we expect them to cut down their lending to the UK borrowers more relative to subsidiaries. 
However, in normal times parent banks are likely to be able to access wholesale markets to substitute 
the lost liquidity, which may make detecting such a (differential) effect on foreign affiliate lending 
difficult, and potentially more difficult than for capital requirements because raising equity to meet 
higher requirements is more costly and takes more time than raising short-term liquidity.   
2.2 Data 
We use data from a number of sources to test these hypotheses. The data on macroprudential policy 
actions has been constructed from a number of sources. Lim et al. (2011), Borio and Shim (2007) and 
Kuttner and Shim (2013) have been the main sources. Data from these sources have been 
supplemented with hand-collected data from searches of regulators' websites and financial stability 
reports, and from communication with relevant authorities. This allowed us to build a dataset 
containing information on macroprudential policy actions in 70 countries over the period 1990 to 
2014. Although the early time period mainly covers actions taken in emerging economies, advanced 
economies have been more proactive in taking macroprudential actions since the global financial 
9 Reserve requirements are often employed by the regulators in the emerging markets as a macroprudential tool. Reinhart 
and Reinhart 1999, Montoro and Moreno 2011, Terrier et al. 2011 suggest that regulators prefer to very reserves 
requirements to tap credit supply rather than increase the interest rates as the later might attract capital inflows and lead to 
depreciation of the domestic currency. 
10 Mora (2014) exploits an increase in reserve requirements in Lebanon which disproportionally affected deposits 
denominated in different currencies’. Deposits denominated in foreign currency were subject to higher reserve requirements, 
relative to domestic currency deposits. Results show that this increase in required reserves had more adverse effects of 
lending provided by banks relying on funds denominated in foreign currency. 
11 This reasoning is in line with the results provided by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) which show that multinational banks 
are able to mitigate domestic liquidity shocks via cross-border flow of funds within the organization.  
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crisis. The dataset covers a wide range of macroprudential actions. We cover any action which is 
'macroprudential'-like, rather than focusing on actions which have been specifically taken for 
macroprudential purposes. In our analysis we exploit information on adjustments to capital 
requirements, reserve requirements and lending standards.12 Information on Capital requirements 
includes changes in the level of both overall capital requirements and sector specific capital 
requirements such as changes in risk weights. Lending standards encompass changes to loan-to-value 
ratios, debt-to-income ratios, and underwriting standards. We are also able to observe changes in 
reserve requirements which traditionally are not considered as a macroprudential tool but are often 
used for financial stability purposes and therefore are likely to have macroprudential consequences.  
To estimate the effect of these regulatory changes on the scale of banks’ business activities via their 
multinational banks operations we use quarterly banks’ balance sheet information provided by the 
Bank of England. This dataset contains financial information for all banks operating in the UK 
between 1997q4 and 2014q1. We use data on lending provided by foreign banks branches and 
subsidiaries and we are able to distinguish between the lending provided to other banks (Interbank 
loans) and non-banks (Private sector loans). 
Financial data provide us with 15,148 observations for 497 foreign banks (both branches and 
subsidiaries) operating during our sample period. We map regulatory data into this dataset which 
allows us observe 191 changes to macroprudential regulation. Next, we restrict our sample to 
institutions which belong to the banking group operating at least one branch and subsidiary over the 
sample period. This is crucial for our identification strategy as it allows us to control for banking 
group-time-varying factors affecting lending by branches and subsidiaries of these groups in the UK. 
However, it also restricts our sample size to 4,107 observations. The number of banks in our final 
sample is reduced to 103 banks (51 branches and 52 subsidiaries). These banks, however, account for 
approximately 75% of total foreign banks’ assets in the UK. We also observe 40% of all of the 
macroprudential regulatory changes in our original dataset. Our sample includes 19 cases of capital 
requirements tightening, 23 lending standards tightening and 35 reserve requirements tightening. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our dependent and explanatory variables as well as timing of 
regulatory changes. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
3. Identification strategy  
3.1 Baseline model 
12 Other types of macroprudential regulation do not vary sufficiently over time during our sample period and therefore are 
excluded from the analysis. 
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We exploit cross-country cross-time variation in the tightening of macroprudential regulation and rely 
on difference-in-differences estimations as our identification strategy. Specifically, we compare 
changes in the evolution of lending prior to and following the introduction of the change to 
macroprudential regulation between treatment and control group. Our treatment group consist of 
foreign branches affected by the change in macroprudential regulation. Control group consist of 
foreign subsidiaries and branches which home country regulators did not introduce changes to 
macroprudential regulation. We estimate the following baseline model:  
∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1), 
where ∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes percentage point change in lending of bank i, part of banking group j, from 
country k, in quarter t. Our main explanatory variable is an interaction term between the dummy 
variable Regulation and dummy variable Type. Regulation takes a value of 1 for quarters and 
countries when a tightening of macroprudential regulation has taken place, and 0 otherwise.13 
Variable Type takes the value of 1 for foreign banks’ branches, and 0 for banks operating in the UK as 
subsidiaries. The coefficient β provides information on the difference in the response of branches and 
subsidiaries to changes in macroprudential regulation.   
Our regressions include a number of bank-time varying control variables denoted by 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Specifically, we control for the size of the branch using log of total assets (Bank size (ln)), and 
differences in the bank type business models including the share of interbank lending (Wholesale).  
The volume of credit provided by foreign affiliates of multinational banks will depend on the 
decisions, and strategy of their parent banks. Therefore, to identify heterogeneous effects of 
regulatory changes on lending provided by branches and subsidiaries we need to control for all the 
factors affecting parent banks (i.e. demand for parent bank products or conditions in the home 
market). Focusing our analysis on branches and subsidiaries belonging to the same banking groups 
allows us to introduce banking group-time-varying fixed effects, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Including these fixed effects 
allows us to compare subsidiaries and branches as if they belonged to the same banking group. 
Therefore, our estimates are unlikely to be affected by parent bank specific factors affecting their 
decisions regarding cross-border lending of their foreign affiliates. 
3.2 Difference-in-difference assumptions 
The difference-in-difference estimates are valid under two assumptions. The first is that the treatment 
event, a change in macroprudential regulation policy is exogenous. In other words, changes in 
macroprudential regulation in the home country should not depend on the lending provided by foreign 
13 In unreported tests we use alternative Regulation variable, taking values of -1 if regulation is loosened in country k at time 
t, and 0 otherwise. This specification yields exactly the same results, which are available upon request. 
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branches and subsidiaries in the UK. The second, (parallel trends assumption) is that the lending 
growth rates of the treatment and control groups are similar prior to the change in the macroprudential 
regulation. This assumption allows us to believe that absent changes in macroprudential regulation 
both branches and subsidiaries’ lending would continue to grow at the same rate and any divergences 
in lending are due to changes in regulation. In this section we discuss results of tests providing 
support for the validity of both assumptions. 
3.2.1 Exogenous treatment event assumption  
Evaluating the effect of bank specific capital requirements on banks’ cross-border activities, Ayiar et 
al. (2014a) argue that regulators are not concerned with the banks’ cross-border operations when 
deciding on the stringency of macroprudential regulation because UK banks’ cross-border activities 
represent a small fraction of the overall operations.  
To test formally whether macroprudential policies at home are not driven by lending growth abroad, 
we use three alternative models. We examine whether lending provided by foreign banks’ branches 
and subsidiaries in the UK increases or decreases the probability of observing changes in the 
stringency of macroprudential regulation in the country of origin of their parent bank. In order to 
perform this analysis we collapse our data at the country-level and model the likelihood of the home 
country of the parent bank tightening its regulation as a function of mean lending growth of foreign 
branches and subsidiaries abroad. If our assumption is valid, we expect lending growth by foreign 
branches to not impact the probability of the home country tightening its prudential policies. 
Table 3 presents the results. In Panel A shows results obtained using complementary log-log 
regressions. In Panel B we show results obtained from logit regressions. Finally, in Panel C we 
present results obtained using a linear probability model. Across all specifications, the coefficient on 
the main variables of interest (mean lending growth) remains statistically indistinguishable from zero, 
suggesting that the volume of banks’ cross-border lending plays no significant role in the bank 
regulators decision to change macroprudential regulation.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3.2.2 Parallel trends assumption 
Now we examine parallel trend assumption. To test this assumption, we begin with a graphical 
illustration presented in Figure 2. In each of the graphs we plot the development in the mean lending 
growth for both types of institutions over the three quarters preceding each change in macroprudential 
regulation. Foreign banks branches lending growth is denoted by a blue solid line and triangles, 
whereas the trend in the lending growth of foreign banks’ subsidiaries is denoted by red dashed line. 
Panel A illustrates the movement in lending to non-bank borrowers (Private sector lending) and Panel 
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B illustrates the movement in the interbank lending. In most cases growth of lending provided by 
branches and subsidiaries exhibits a very similar pattern, suggesting that our data meet this 
assumption.  
  [Insert Figure 2 here] 
As an additional check, we follow Lemmon and Roberts (2010) and conduct t-tests for the differences 
in the quarterly growth rates of interbank and private sector lending provided by branches and 
subsidiaries of foreign banks in the UK. Note that this assumption does not require identical levels of 
lending growth between treatment and control groups, they are differenced out (Lemmon and Roberts 
(2010)).  
Table 3 shows results of these tests for three quarters prior to changes to capital requirements (Panel 
A), lending standards (Panel B) and reserve requirements (Panel C). In each panel we compare growth 
rates of both lending categories. In all but one cases these differences cannot be statistically 
distinguished from zero. This suggests that prior to regulatory changes the evolution in foreign banks’ 
lending does not vary with the organisational form of the institution. Therefore, as discussed, we 
could expect that the potential differences are the result of changes in the macroprudential regulation 
rather than pre-treatment trends in the evolution of lending steaming from individual characteristics of 
branches and subsidiaries (e.g. different business models). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
5. Results  
5.1 Main results 
Table 4 presents our main results. All our regressions include banking group-specific time-varying 
fixed effect, and bank type fixed effects. Each regression controls for the size of the institution 
measured as a logarithm of total assets (Bank size (ln)), and share of interbank loans to total loans 
(Wholesale), a proxy for the differences in institutions’ business models. We remove years 2008 and 
2009 to avoid our estimates being driven by an extraordinary high frequency of regulatory changes 
during the crisis period14. In all specifications we cluster standard errors at the institutions’ home 
country level to account for serial correlation within each panel (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Duflo 
(2004)). The figures in brackets report t-statistics.  
14 We also performed our tests including the crisis period and the results were almost identical to those presented 
in Table 4. Additionally, we perform robustness tests where we remove banks from countries where changes to 
macroprudential regulation occur at a very high frequency (see Panel D of Table 1) to avoid our results being 
driven by factors specific to those countries. Results of these tests again are almost identical to those presented 
in Table 4.  
12 
 
                                                          
Columns 1 to 4 show the effect of changes in foreign banks’ home country macroprudential regulation 
on lending provided by foreign branches and subsidiaries to the non-bank private sector in the UK. 
Column 1 reports regression results of the model which includes interactions between the Type and all 
the regulatory dummies. The coefficients show that following tightening of capital requirements 
branches reduce their lending growth by -5.9 percentage points more relative to subsidiaries. 
However, t-statistics of -0.62 suggest that this effect is not statistically significant at any conventional 
level. Similarly, the t-statistic for the coefficients on the interactions between the Type and the lending 
standards and reserve requirements shows that the effect of these regulations cannot be distinguished 
from zero. The results in Column 1 are reinforced by the results in Columns 2-4 where we include 
interaction terms for each regulation individually in each regression. Again, none of our main 
explanatory variables exhibit statistically significant effects on private sector (non-bank) lending 
growth. 
Columns 5 to 8 show the results for the effect of macroprudential regulation on interbank lending 
provided by foreign banks in the UK. Again, we first report the estimates for the tests where the 
interactions between Type and all three regulations are included at once. We find heterogeneity in 
lending provided by branches and subsidiaries in response to changes in capital requirements. We find 
that foreign banks’ branches reduce lending to other banks operating in the UK by 6.3 pp (coefficient 
-0.063) more than subsidiaries following a tightening of capital requirements. This effect is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (t-statistic of -3.13). The economic magnitude of this effect is 
also significant. The mean interbank lending growth in our sample is 5pp. For a mean bank the 
coefficient of -0.063 (or -6.3pp) translates into a reduction of interbank lending growth rate from 5pp 
to -1.3pp.  
The remaining coefficients on reserve requirements and lending standards again lack statistical 
significance with t-statistics of 0.54 and 1.07, correspondingly. In columns 6 to 8 we report the 
estimates of regressions where the effect of each regulatory change is evaluated individually. 
Estimates of these tests support the results in Column 5. The coefficient on capital requirements is 
again negative and statistically significant, whilst the coefficients for our two additional regulation 
variables remain indistinguishable from zero. 
Among the control variables, we find that the size of the foreign affiliate does not influence lending, 
whereas the share of the interbank loans significantly correlates only with non-bank private sector 
loans. The negative sign of the coefficient suggests that a greater focus on wholesale lending 
provision decreases the reduction in the growth rate of loans to the private sector.   
Our baseline results suggest that tighter capital regulation in the home country has a stronger effect on 
lending provided by multinational banks’ branches compared to subsidiaries. These results are in line 
with our predictions. A greater degree of control of the parent bank over its affiliates operating in 
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form of a branch makes it is easier to reduce the banking group’s risk-weighted assets through 
contraction of branch lending. But we only find heterogeneity in the provision of lending to banks.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
5.2 Robustness tests 
We run a number of robustness tests. First, we examine if our results are driven or biased by events 
coinciding with the changes in macroprudential regulation. Such events could bias the results the 
extent to which they affect UK branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks differently. One type of 
event is a change in microprudential, bank-specific, capital requirements, of the sort examined in 
Aiyar et al. (2014a, 2014b). Banks subject to these requirements include UK-owned banks and foreign 
subsidiaries of foreign banks, but not branches of foreign banks. Imagine a tightening of capital 
requirements in a given home country of a foreign bank overlaps with a loosening of capital 
requirements of its UK subsidiaries. In that case it is possible that the bank’s branches will reduce 
their lending in response to the capital requirements in their home country, whilst subsidiaries faced 
with lower capital requirements in the UK will increase their lending. Such situation is likely to render 
an upward bias on our treatment effect, since the differences in branches and subsidiaries’ lending 
growth around the change in macroprudential regulation will increase. To test if our main results can 
be biased by such events we exclude from our sample all subsidiaries which were subject to changes 
in bank-specific capital requirements. Table 5 presents the resulting regressions, which are very close 
to those presented in Table 4. Most importantly the effect of capital requirements on interbank lending 
is still statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Secondly, we revisit the validity of the assumption that the changes in macroprudential regulation are 
exogenous. Whited and Roberts (2012) argue that if the treatment effect is randomly assigned then the 
magnitude of this effect should not depend on the inclusion of control variables in the model. 
Otherwise, random assignment for the treatment variable should be called into question. Table 6 
presents results of tests in which we omit bank-specific time-varying control variables from the 
baseline specification. The magnitudes of the coefficients for the main explanatory variable are very 
similar to the ones reported in Table 4. Most importantly the magnitude for the effect of capital 
requirement changes on interbank lending is almost exactly the same for both models. These results 
suggest that the treatment effect is exogenous with respect to characteristics of individual branches 
and subsidiaries. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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Our third robustness test reconsiders the parallel trends assumption. We replicate our main results 
forwarding our treatment variable by one, two and three quarters. This test allows us to establish 
whether the treatment effect we observe in Table 4 is a result of some general trends in lending 
behaviour of branches and subsidiaries or truly due to changes in the macroprudential regulation. The 
intuition is that if the latter is true we should not observe statistically significant differences in lending 
of branches and subsidiaries prior to the real occurrence of the regulatory change. We plot the 
coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals estimated using these tests in Figure 3. In all cases 
forwarded treatment variable shows no statistical significance, which further strengthens the argument 
that the disparities between the lending provided by foreign banks branches and subsidiaries are due 
to changes in the intensity of macroprudential regulation in their home country. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Next we perform three falsification tests to check whether differences between the growth of lending 
provided by branches and subsidiaries presented in Table 4 can be attributed to changes in 
macroprudential regulation or are driven by other factors, or chance.  We run two Monte Carlo 
simulations with 1,000 replications where first we randomly assign placebo treatment to branches 
affected by changes in regulation in their home markets but we pretend that these changes occurred in 
periods preceding their actual occurrence. In the second falsification test we pretend that the change in 
macroprudential regulation affected branches from countries which never altered their 
macroprudential regulation. We estimate the following regression 
∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (2), 
where Placebo is a binary variable randomly set to 1 for banks in the treatment group (affected 
foreign banks’ branches) in periods preceding actual change to macroprudential regulation, and later 
equal to 1 for banks in countries where no changes to macroprudential regulation occurred during our 
sample period. We repeat this process 1,000 times saving the p-value on the coefficient β from each 
regression and compute the rejection rates of the null hypothesis β=0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Because we know that placebo treatments should have had no effect in both tests, we know that the 
null of zero effect is true. We should therefore only reject the null by making Type 1 errors. The 
results of this exercise are shown in Panel A and Panel B of Table 7. The rejection rates for all 
dependent variables are in line with those that would occur through Type 1 errors. This analysis 
further strengthens our main results. 
In our third falsification test we want to observe if UK banks alter their lending during quarters in 
which changes to macroprudential regulation where taking place in other countries. Results of these 
tests are important for two reasons. Finding significant effects would suggests that UK-owned banks’ 
lending is also affected by changes to macroprudential regulation via reduced availability of interbank 
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funds, which we document in Table 4. However, given that banks can substitute interbank funds from 
affected institutions with funds from non-affected banks or with other type of funding significant 
results may also suggest that some other UK-specific factors may be coinciding with changes in 
macroprudential regulation in foreign markets. To this end we restrict our sample only to UK banks 
and estimate the following model 
∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,         (3), 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 takes a value of one for periods in which variable Regulationkt in specification 1 is 
equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. We generate placebo treatment variable for each type of macroprudential 
regulation. Results of this test are presented in Panel C of Table 7. Coefficient on all of our placebo 
treatment variables remains indistinguishable from zero providing support for our baseline results. 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
In our final robustness test we examine sensitivity of our estimates to alternative standard errors 
clustering. Our main results are estimated using specification in which we cluster heteroskedasticity-
adjusted standard errors at the country level. Table 8 presents the results for tests where errors are 
clustered at the banking group level. Our findings remain very similar. Standard errors are slightly 
higher compared to those in our baseline model; however the effect of capital requirements on foreign 
banks’ interbank lending is still significant at 5% level.15 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.3 Log-run effects 
Our baseline results explore heterogeneity in the effect of regulatory changes on contemporaneous 
lending provided by foreign banks in the UK. But it is also important to investigate the duration of 
these effects. To consider this we modify regression specification 1 in Table 4 by replacing the 
interaction term with its first, second and third lag. Significant coefficients of the lags of the 
interactions will inform us about the duration of the effects found in Table 4.  
Table 9 present the results of this analysis. In all of the regressions the lagged interactions between the 
Type and Regulation variables are statistically insignificant. This suggests that the differences in the 
effect of changes in macroprudential regulation on lending provided by foreign banks’ branches and 
subsidiaries are only contemporaneous and disappear after the quarter in which changes occurred. 
These results are not surprising given that tighter capital requirements require immediate responses 
from the banking group. Since the higher degree of control over the branch allows the parent bank to 
15 Additionally we perform tests with standard errors clustered at the individual bank level. Results are similar to those in 
Table 4 and are also available upon request. 
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immediately adjust its affiliate branch lending we would expect that the adjustment would be most 
significant around the announcement of the new capital adequacy regime. In the later quarters, we 
would not observe the significant differences in lending growth between branches and subsidiaries 
due to lack of further adjustments or due to the fact that lending adjustments in case of subsidiary 
require more time. Once they are in place the differences between lending growth provided by both 
types of institutions diminishes. 
 [Insert Table 9 here]  
6. Conclusion 
Studies show that multinational banks transmit negative shocks to their parent banks’ balance sheets – 
including changes in regulation – across national borders. In this paper we examine if the magnitude 
of the spillover effects depends on the organisation structure of banks’ foreign affiliates. We exploit 
cross-country-time variation in the implementation of macroprudential regulation to test if lending in 
the UK of foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries respond differently to a tightening of capital 
requirements, lending standards or reserve requirements in foreign banks’ home countries. Focusing 
on differences in lending responses of branches and subsidiaries which belong to the banking group 
allows us to  control for all factors which might affect parent banks’ decisions regarding their foreign 
affiliates’ lending. 
Our results show that whether foreign branches or subsidiaries react differently to changes in 
regulation in their home countries  depends on the type of regulation and the type of lending. 
Multinational banks’ branches respond to tighter capital requirements in their home countries by 
contracting their lending more than subsidiaries. On average, branch lending in the UK grows by 6.3 
percentage point slower relative to subsidiaries following a tightening of capital requirements in the 
bank’s home country. This is in line with our hypothesis which predicts that branches lending will be 
affected to due to higher degree of control which parent banks has over its foreign branches. But this 
heterogeneity in response to capital requirements is only observed in case of lending to other banks. 
We find that the response of lending to non-bank borrowers to a tightening in capital requirements 
does not depend on the organizational forms of foreign banks’ UK affiliates. Turning to the impact of 
a tightening in lending standards or reserve requirements, we find that there are no differential effects 
on branch and subsidiary lending. 
Additional analysis suggests that stronger contraction in provision of interbank loans exhibited by 
branches is only contemporaneous. Our research provides evidence that branch structure is more 
likely to transmit negative shocks affecting their parent institutions in the home country, relative to 
subsidiary structure. However, the effects we find are short-lived which means that the potential 
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negative effects involved with higher number of foreign branches in the market we find in this study 
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Sample representativeness and summary statistics 
Panel A: Bank characteristics 
   
All banks Banks in the sample 
   
Observations Mean Observations Mean 
Private sector lending growth 15,148 0.023 4,107 0.035 
Interbank lending growth 15,148 0.044 4,107 0.050 
Bank size (ln total assets) 15,148 14.084 4,107 15.216 
Interbank share 15,148 0.729 4,107 0.672 
Panel B: Regulatory changes and number of banks 
   
Total  Included in the sample 
Capital requirements tightening 43 19 
Lending standards tightening 75 23 
Reserve requirements tightening 73 35 
All foreign banks 497 103 
Foreign banks branches 321 51 
Foreign banks subsidiaries 176 52 
Panel C: Summary statistics 
Variable  N Mean SD Min Max Source 
Dependent variables 
Private sector lending growth 4,107 0.035 0.243 -0.42 0.62 Bank of England 
Interbank lending growth 4,107 0.050 0.306 -0.51 0.89 Bank of England 
Regulatory dummies 
Capital requirements tightening 4,107 0.006 0.078 0 1 IMF/BIS 
Lending standards tightening 4,107 0.015 0.124 0 1 IMF/BIS 
Reserve requirements tightening 4,107 0.009 0.097 0 1 IMF/BIS 
Control variables 
Bank size (ln total assets) 4,107 15.216 2.250 6.03 20.21 Bank of England 
Interbank share 4,107 0.672 0.320 0.02 0.97 Bank of England 










Country Quarter Country Quarter 
Australia 1998q3  Portugal 1998q4  Philipines 1998q2 China 2007q4
b 
South Africa 1998q4  Portugal 1999q1  France 1998q4 Indonesia 2007q4 Philipines 1998q4  China 2001q1  Philipines 1998q4 China 2008q1
a,b 
China 2002q1  Ireland 2001q4  Germany 1999q1 China 2008q2
a,b 
Australia 2004q4  China 2003q2  Portugal 1999q1 Indonesia 2009q4
a,b 
Indonesia 2004q4b  Italy 2004q1  France 1999q1 Indonesia 2010q1 Indonesia 2005q1b  China 2004q3  Spain 1999q1 China 2010q1
b 
Indonesia 2005q3b  China 2005q1  Greece 1999q3 Indonesia 2010q2 Indonesia 2005q4b  Greece 2005q4  Italy 2000q1 China 2010q2
b 
Ireland 2006q1  China 2006q1  France 2000q1 China 2010q4
b 
Ireland 2006q2  China 2006q2  Ireland 2000q1 China 2011q1
b 
Indonesia 2006q2b  France 2007q1  Germany 2000q1 China 2011q2
b 
Indonesia 2006q3b  Canada 2008q4
a,b  Greece 2000q2 China 2011q3
b 
Indonesia 2006q4b  China 2009q4
a,b  Indonesia 2000q3   Indonesia 2007q1b  Indonesia 2010q1  Greece 2001q1   Italy 2007q1  China 2010q1  China 2003q3
b 
  Spain 2008q1a  Canada 2010q2
b  China 2004q2
b 
  Spain 2008q2a  Canada 2011q1
b  Indonesia 2004q3   Indonesia 2008q2a,b  Canada 2011q2
b  Switzerland 2005q1   Switzerland 2009q1a  Canada 2011q4
b  China 2006q3
b 
  Indonesia 2009q4a,b  Indonesia 2011q4  China 2006q4
b 
  Indonesia 2010q3b  Canada 2012q3
b  China 2007q1
b 
  Indonesia 2010q4b  Canada 2013q1
b  Indonesia 2007q1   Switzerland 2012q2  China 2013q1  China 2007q2
b 
  
   
USA 2014q1  China 2007q3
b 
  Note. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample and information on the timing of changes to macroprudential 
regulation. a) Excluded from the main analysis due to occurrence during the crisis period; b) Excluded in the robustness test to tests if our 






Panel A: Complementary log-log model 
 
Capital requirements tightening Lending standards tightening Reserve requirements tightening 
                    



























          Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 413 413 413 462 462 462 618 618 618 
Panel B: Logit model 
 
Capital requirements tightening Lending standards tightening Reserve requirements tightening 
                    



























          Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 541 541 541 614 614 614 677 677 677 
Panel C: Linear probability model 
 
Capital requirements tightening Lending standards tightening Reserve requirements tightening 
                   



























          Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,241 1,241 1,241 1,241 1,241 1,241 1,241 1,241 1,241 
Private sector lending 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.075 0.074 0.074 
Notes. This table presents results obtained using Complementary log-log regressions (Panel A), logistic regressions (Panel B) and linear probability model (Panel C) which verify that changes in the macroprudential 
regulation in banks’ home countries are exogenous with respect to banks’ lending to the UK borrowers. Our dependent variables are binary variables equal to 1 for countries and quarters where tightening of capital 
requirements, lending standards or reserve requirements occur, and 0 otherwise. Our explanatory variables are lending growth rates to non-bank borrowers (Private sector lending) and other banks (Interbank lending). 




Parallel trends assumption 
Panel A: Capital requirements 
 Period t-3 Period t-2 Period t-1 
 Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
Private sector loans growth -0.011 -0.92 0.36 0.005 0.29 0.77 -0.008 -0.29 0.82 
Interbank loans growth -0.021 -1.80 0.03* -0.002 -0.15 0.98 -0.027 -0.87 0.39 
Panel B: Lending standards 
 Period t-3 Period t-2 Period t-1 
 Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) 
Private sector loans growth -0.015 -0.86 0.18 -0.005 -0.57 0.56 -0.021 -1.66 0.11 
Interbank loans growth -0.012 -1.18 0.14 -0.004 -0.25 0.31 -0.008 -0.69 0.67 
Panel C: Reserve requirements 
 Period t-3 Period t-2 Period t-1 
 Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) 
Private sector loans growth -0.037 -1.75 0.19 0.007 0.47 0.55 -0.024 -1.55 0.15 
Interbank loans growth -0.006 -0.42 0.62 -0.021 -1.25 0.16 -0.022 -1.41 0.17 
Notes: Table 3 presents the results of t-tests examining parallel trends assumption. We test for the differences in mean lending growth rates (both interbank and private sector lending) in three quarters preceding 





















Macroprudential regulation and cross-border lending  
 
Private sector loans Interbank loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  



































Type 0.030* 0.031* 0.030* 0.030 -0.042** -0.041** -0.041** -0.042** 
 (1.86) (1.76) (1.89) (1.70) (-2.38) (-2.30) (-2.31) (-2.40) 
Bank size (ln) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (1.56) (1.58) (1.59) (1.57) 
Wholesale -0.101** -0.101** -0.101** -0.101** 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.039 
 
(-2.18) (-2.24) (-2.19) (-2.25) (1.03) (1.02) (1.01) (1.03) 
         Observations 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 
R-squared 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.515 0.514 0.514 0.514 
Bank Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 4 presents results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of macroprudential regulatory changes on lending of foreign banks in the 
UK. We estimate the following model: ∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Our dependent variables include foreign banks’ 
lending to the UK private (non-bank) sector and foreign banks’ interbank lending in the UK. All dependent variables are in percentage point growth rates. The main 
explanatory variable is an interaction term between Regulation and Type. Regulation is a dummy for regulatory change, equal to 1 if regulation is tightened in country i 
at quarter t, and 0 for all other periods. Type is a dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign bank operates in the UK as a branch, and 0 if it operates as a subsidiary. The 
coefficient β provides information about the effect of macroprudential regulation tightening. The set of bank-time varying control variables BC include the logarithm of 
banks’ total assets (Bank size (ln)), and the share of interbank lending (Wholesale). Additionally, regressions include banking group-quarter-fixed effects. Standard 


































Robustness test: Subsidiaries subject to bank specific capital requirements removed 
 Private sector loans Interbank loans 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Capital regulation*Type -0.070 -0.050 -0.050*** -0.055** 
 
(-0.56) (-0.41) (-2.94) (-2.76) 
Type 0.006 0.027 -0.034** -0.046** 
 (0.45) (1.34) (-2.48) (-2.32) 


















         
Observations 3,882 3,882 3,882 3,882 
R-squared 0.529 0.542 0.528 0.533 
Bank Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 5 presents results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of macroprudential regulatory changes on lending of foreign 
banks in the UK. We estimate the following model: ∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Our dependent variables 
include foreign banks’ lending to the UK private (non-bank) sector and foreign banks’ interbank lending in the UK. All dependent variables are in percentage 
point growth rates. The main explanatory variable is an interaction term between Regulation and Type. Regulation is a dummy for regulatory change, equal 
to 1 if regulation is tightened in country i at quarter t, and 0 for all other periods. Type is a dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign bank operates in the UK as a 
branch, and 0 if it operates as a subsidiary. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of macroprudential regulation tightening. The set of bank-
time varying control variables BC include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size (ln)), and the share of interbank lending (Wholesale). Additionally, 
regressions include banking group-quarter-fixed effects. We remove subsidiaries which experienced change in bank specific capital requirements imposed by 




































Macroprudential regulation and cross-border lending: Control variables excluded 
 
Private sector loans Interbank loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  



































Type 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.030** -0.028** -0.029** -0.030** 
 (0.45) (0.59) (0.46) (0.51) (-2.60) (-2.45) (-2.48) (-2.67) 
         
Observations 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 
R-squared 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.509 0.509 0.509 0.509 
Bank Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 6 presents results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of macroprudential regulatory changes on lending of foreign 
banks in the UK. We estimate the following model: ∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Our dependent variables include 
foreign banks’ lending to the UK private (non-bank) sector and foreign banks’ interbank lending in the UK. All dependent variables are in percentage point 
growth rates. The main explanatory variable is an interaction term between Regulation and Type. Regulation is a dummy for regulatory change, equal to 1 if 
regulation is tightened in country i at quarter t, and 0 for all other periods. Type is a dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign bank operates in the UK as a 
branch, and 0 if it operates as a subsidiary. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of macroprudential regulation tightening. Additionally, 
regressions include banking group-quarter-fixed effects and institution type-fixed effects. We exclude the set of bank-time varying control variables BC. 






































Panel A: Falsification test 1 Panel B: Falsification test 2 Panel C: Falsification test 3 


















      
  Placebo Lending standards 0.0395 -0.0111 
Rejection rates at 1% level 
(2-tailed test): 
Rejection rates at 1% level  












         Rejection rates at 5% level  
(2-tailed test): 
Rejection rates at 5% level  
(2-tailed test): 
  Controls 









4.30%    Year FE Yes Yes 
         Rejection rates at 10% level  
(2-tailed test): 
Rejection rates at 10% level  
(2-tailed test):    Observations 4,852 4,852 
6.30%   9.60% 6.70%   8.70%    Cluster 0.077 0.132 
Note. Table 7 presents Monte Carlo simulations in Panel A and Panel B. We estimate the regression ∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
where in Panel A, Placebo is a binary variable randomly set to 1 for banks in the treatment group (affected foreign banks’ branches) in periods preceding 
actual change in macroprudential regulation. In Panel B, we randomly assign banks to placebo treatment status setting Placebo equal to 1 for banks in 
countries where no changes to macroprudential regulation occurred during our sample period. We estimate the regression and save the p-value on the 
coefficient β and repeat this process 1,000 times and compute the rejection rates of the null hypothesis β=0 at the  1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Panel C presents 
results of tests where we examine the effect of macroprudential regulation on UK-owned banks. Here, only UK-owned banks are included in the sample. We 
estimate the following regression ∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where our dependent variable denotes a growth rate in lending provided 
to non-bank borrowers (Private sector lending) and other banks (Interbank lending). 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 takes a value of one for periods  in which variable Regulationkt 
in specification 1 is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. We generate Placebo variable for each type of macroprudential regulation. Regressions include variables 
controlling for the size of the institution and share of intrbank loans on its balance sheet, and bank and quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 





































Regressions with standard errors clustered on the banking group level 
 
Private sector loans Interbank loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  



































Type 0.030 0.031* 0.030* 0.030 -0.042* -0.041** -0.041** -0.042** 
 (1.54) (1.76) (1.89) (1.70) (-1.82) (-2.30) (-2.31) (-2.40) 
Bank size (ln) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (1.23) (1.58) (1.59) (1.57) 
Wholesale -0.101** -0.101** -0.101** -0.101** 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.039 
 
(-2.40) (-2.24) (-2.19) (-2.25) (0.81) (1.02) (1.01) (1.03) 
         Observations 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 
R-squared 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.515 0.514 0.514 0.514 
Bank Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Group Group Group Group Group Group Group Group 
Notes. Table 8 presents results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of macroprudential regulatory changes on lending of foreign 
banks in the UK. We estimate the following model: ∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Our dependent variables 
include foreign banks’ lending to the private (non-bank) UK sector and foreign banks’ interbank lending in the UK. All dependent variables are in percentage 
point growth rates. The main explanatory variable is an interaction term between Regulation and Type. Regulation is a dummy for regulatory change, equal 
to 1 if regulation is tightened in country i at quarter t, and 0 for all other periods. Type is a dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign bank operates in the UK as a 
branch, and 0 if it operates as a subsidiary. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of macroprudential regulation tightening. The set of bank-
time varying control variables BC include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size (ln)), and the share of interbank lending (Wholesale). Additionally, 
regressions include banking group-quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the banking group level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** 




































Private sector loans Interbank loans  
             



























Type 0.030 0.031 0.031 -0.040** -0.039** -0.039** 
 (1.71) (1.58) (1.44) (-2.24) (-2.31) (-2.22) 
Observations 4,093 3,999 3,904 4,093 3,999 3,904 
R-squared 0.529 0.534 0.538 0.515 0.515 0.515 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country 
 
Private sector loans Interbank loans  
      
Lending standards*Type (t+1) -0.012 
  
0.069 
   (-0.26) 
  
(1.72) 



















Type 0.030* 0.030 0.031 -0.042** -0.038** -0.040** 
 (1.75) (1.56) (1.48) (-2.39) (-2.26) (-2.27) 
Observations 4,093 3,999 3,904 4,093 3,999 3,904 
R-squared 0.529 0.535 0.538 0.515 0.515 0.515 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country 
 
Private sector loans Interbank loans  
      



























Type 0.029 0.031 0.032 -0.040** -0.039** -0.040** 
 (1.67) (1.56) (1.49) (-2.18) (-2.33) (-2.31) 
Observations 4,093 3,999 3,904 4,093 3,999 3,904 
R-squared 0.529 0.534 0.538 0.514 0.515 0.515 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 9 presents results examining the duration of the effects found in Table 4. We replicate regressions in Table 4 replacing treatment 






















Foreign banks’ lending in the UK 
 
Notes. Figure 1 presents evolution in the market share of total lending, lending to the (non-bank) private sector, and interbank 
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Parallel trends assumption 
 
Notes: Figure 2 illustrates the behaviour of quarterly changes in the dependent variables, for three quarters preceding changes in 
macroprudential regulation tightening. Branches of foreign banks (the treatment group) are represented by a triangle and solid 
line, whereas foreign banks’ subsidiaries (the control group) are depicted by a dashed line. Private sector lending refers to foreign 




































































































Notes: Figure 3 illustrates the results of placebo regressions. We replicate the results from Table 4 replacing the treatment 
variable in regression specification 1 in Table 4 with its forwarded values by 1, 2 and 3 quarters. We plot the coefficient 
estimate and the 95% confidence intervals. Private sector lending refers to foreign banks’ lending to the private (non-bank) 



























































Panel B: Interbank lending
32 
 
